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WELLS FARGO V. COMMISSIONER:
DEDUCTIBILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICER
SALARIES DURING MERGER AND THE NEED
FOR RULES OVER STANDARDS
I. INTRODUCTION
The last ten years have seen an incredible expansion of corpo-
rate merger activity, with mergers increasing in both quantity and
size.' The ongoing $113 billion merger of Time Warner and Amer-
ica Online is the largest in U.S. history.2 The telecommunications
industry has seen a consolidation of its major players into a handful
of enormous corporations,3 and the trend has not been limited to the
"new economy." United and American Airlines are both presently
seeking approval for acquisitions of smaller airlines,4 while the
banking industry has been similarly restless.5 These mergers call
down an avalanche of difficult tax issues, one of which is the de-
ductibility of corporate officer salaries during the transition period.
The Internal Revenue Code allows businesses to deduct "all the
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable
year in carrying on any trade or business."6 However, when an
1. See Stephen M. Hader & Scott D. Syfert, The Immigration Conse-
quences of Mergers, Acquisitions, and Other Corporate Restntcturing: A
Practitioner's Guide, 24 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 547, 547-50 (1999).
2. See Michael Stroh, FTC Clears Union of AOL, Time Warner, BALT.
SUN, Dec. 15,2000, at IA.
3. See Jube Shiver Jr., U.S. Files Lawsuit to Block Worldcom-Sprint
Merger, L.A. TIMES, June 28, 2000, at Al.
4. See Frank Swoboda, Delta, Continental in Talks: 'Very Early' Discus-
sions Held Before U.S. Decisions on 2 Bigger Airline Mergers, WASH. POST,
Feb. 3, 2001, at El.
5. See Lee Meyerson & Maripat Alpuche, Structural Defenses to Unsolic-
ited Takeover Offers and Bids in the Banking Industry, in THE NEW
AGGRESSIVE ERA IN FINANCIAL INSTrTUTIoNS MERGERS AND AcQuisMONS
77,79 (H. Rodgin Cohen & Charles M. Nathan eds., 1996).
6. I.R.C. § 162(a) (West 2000).
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expenditure has the effect of creating a new asset, or improving an
old asset,7 the expenditure must be capitalized--deducted incre-
mentally over the life of the asset or benefit.
During normal tax years, officer salaries are deductible as ordi-
nary and necessary business expenses. Some interesting deductibil-
ity questions arise when companies merge. It is not obvious whether
merger activities should be considered ordinary business operation
for purposes of § 162. During a merger, the corporate officers of
both parties often cease their day-to-day operations, and take up
merger-related work.
On August 28, 2000, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a
case called Wells Fargo v. Commissioner,9 created a new test for de-
ductibility of officer salaries during merger.' 0 The "direct/indirect"
test was established as a distinct offshoot of the "origin of the claim
doctrine." ' 1 The test proves clumsy and unwieldy in the officer sal-
ary context, and its implications outside of this narrow context be-
come much more problematic.
The interpretation problems with the direct/indirect test recall
the ubiquitous rules-versus-standards debate. The issue of officer
salaries during merger will recur under substantially similar fact
patterns and is a perfect candidate for a rules application. Further-
more, the Wells Fargo court should have expressly limited the test to
officer salary issues, because, applied to capitalization and deduction
issues generally, the test proves completely inconsistent with §§ 162
and 263.
Part II of this Note outlines the Tax Code sections governing
capitalization and deduction, and the economic policies behind them.
It traces the judicial development' of capitalization and deduction in
its modem formulation, from the 1971 Supreme Court case of Com-
missioner v. Lincoln Savings to the subject case. Part III reviews the
facts of the recent Wells Fargo case, and the conflicting decisions
7. See I.R.C. § 263 (West 2000).
8. See INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm'r, 503 U.S. 79, 88 (1992).
9. 224 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2000).
10. See id. at 886-88.
11. See Edward J. Schnee & Nancy J. Stara, The Origin of the Claim Test:
A Search for Objectivity, 13 AKRON TAX J. 97 (1997); Timothy A. Rodgers,
Note, The Transaction Approach to the Origin of the Claim Doctrine: A Pro-
posed Cure for Chronic Inconsistency, 55 BROOK. L. REv. 905 (1989).
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reached in the Tax Court and Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. Part
IV of this Note will explore the practical mistakes of the Wells Fargo
court's direct/indirect standard for officer salary deductibility. It will
suggest an alternative to the direct/indirect test; a rule which pre-
serves the policy behind the test, but eliminates most of its ambigui-
ties. This Note frames the analysis of its proposed test within the
rules-versus-standards debate, and concludes that a judicial rule in
this context would reduce system abuses and litigation expenses for
taxpayers and the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS" or "Service").
Finally this Note will briefly explore the probable effects of Wells
Fargo on capitalization and deduction issues generally.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Capital Versus Ordinary Expenses
As a basic policy matter, the federal government only taxes a
business's net income.' 2 The IRS's method for arriving at net profit
is to begin with the assumption that all monies taken in by a business
are nondeductible.' 3 The Internal Revenue Code then provides a
handful of classifications within which businesses may claim deduc-
tions; usually expenses necessary to earning revenue. However, not
all deductions are taxed within the same time frame. Some can be
deducted, in full, during the tax year in which they were incurred.
Others must be capitalized-deducted in yearly increments for as
long as the expense produces benefit to the business.
14
The rationale for capitalization becomes evident when a corpo-
ration purchases a major asset, or pays out an unusually large ex-
pense. For instance, imagine a small delivery business with a gross
income of $100,000 per year. The firm wishes to purchase two ad-
ditional delivery vans. If the firm were allowed to deduct the entire
12. See JOSEPH BANKnAN ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX: EXAMPLES AND
EXPLANATIONS 248 (2d ed. 1998). The apparent rationale behind this policy is
to foster a healthy business environment by taxing only that which is truly
profit.
13. A related assumption is that expenses are not deductible unless specifi-
cally provided for in the Internal Revenue Code or regulations. See RAY M.
SOMMERFELD ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO TAxATION 6-1 (1980).
14. See BANKMAN, supra note 12, at 247.
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cost of the vans in the year in which it was incurred, and after de-
ducting its normal operational expenses, 15 the firm would likely not
have any taxable income for that year, even though it grossed
$100,000. Because of the time value of money, such a tax scheme
would be preferable to the firm, and indeed, to most businesses. The
federal government would be allowing the firm to avoid all income
tax payments that year. Meanwhile, the firm would be making reve-
nue aided by the new vans.
Capitalization rectifies this potential discrepancy. It is rooted in
the overarching concept of matching: making sure that deductions
match contemporaneously with corresponding costs of doing busi-
ness. 6 Businesses clearly prefer current deduction while the gov-
ernment tends toward capitalization. They both, of course, want
their money sooner rather than later.
B. The Statutory Framework
The basic statutory scheme for business expenditures begins
with two statutes and flows outward. One statute describes capital
expenses and another defines deductible business costs. A host of
other laws interpret the two categories.17
1. The controlling pair
Sections 162 and 263 of the Internal Revenue Code are the
bookends of corporate expense deduction. These two statutes are
both mutually exclusive and mandatory; a business wanting to claim
tax exemption for an expense must do so under one of these two
rules, and never both.'
8
15. Such expenses include everything from employee salaries and rent to
paper clips and manila folders.
16. See generally Roger T. Weitkamp, Comment, Taxation of Loan Origi-
nation Expenditures: Lenders May No Longer Bank on Deductibility, 16 GA.
ST. U. L. REv. 477, 481-84 (1999) (explaining the theory of matching); Byron
Pavano, Note, Life in All Its Fullness: A Discussion of Capitalization v. De-
duction, 39 B.C. L. REV. 253, 256-57 (1997) (explaining matching).
17. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 167 (West 2000) (determining the life of an asset for
purposes of deduction or capitalization); I.R.C. § 261 (West 2000) (outlining
the "[g]eneral rule for disallowance of deductions").
18. See I.R.C. § 161 (West 2000).
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Section 162 provides that a business may deduct any expense it
incurs in the process of making money.19 Although the statute con-
tains a number of requirements, case law tends to focus only on the
words "ordinary" and "necessary." 20 Conversely, § 263 provides:
"No deduction shall be allowed for (1) [a]ny amount paid out for
new buildings or for permanent improvements or betterments made
to increase the value of any property or estate."21 Courts have given
this rule a life of its own. It has come to apply to much more than
just "new buildings" or improvements upon an "estate." It applies to
expenses ranging from physical assets to intangible benefits; ma-
chinery to reputation. Whether such judicial activism was proper or
warranted is the subject of another discussion, but for present pur-
poses, it is enough to recognize that broad interpretations of § 263
have given rise to dozens of capitalization issues, one of which will
be discussed below.
2. Peripheral statutes
Various tax statutes supplement §§ 162 and 263, aiding in de-
terminations of which of the two apply to a given expense. For in-
stance, § 161 ensures that once it has been determined that § 263 ap-
plies to a given expense, capitalization will always trump ordinary
deduction.22 Therefore, the choice set out in the preceding subsec-
tion, between capitalization and deduction, can be simplified. As
long as the expense is a business expense, the question becomes:
Does § 263 apply? Or, in other words, does the expense in question
require capitalization?
Another statute relevant to the discussion infra, § 165(a), states
that a company may deduct "any loss sustained during the taxable
year and not compensated by insurance or otherwise."' ' Among
other things, courts have determined this section to include attempts
to guard against a hostile takeover, whether successful or not.24
19. See I.R.C. § 162 (West 2000).
20. See, e.g., Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113-16 (1933) (focusing
on the meaning of the word "ordinary").
21. I.R.C. § 263(a)(1) (West 2000).
22. See I.R.C. § 161 (West 2000).
23. I.R.C. § 165(a) (West 2000).
24. See United States v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. (In re Federated Dep't
Stores), 171 B.R. 603, 608 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1994).
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More generally, the statute allows deductions for any business-
related plans that are later abandoned.25
C. The Judicial Framework
1. Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass'n
The 1971 Supreme Court case of Commissioner v. Lincoln Sav-
ings & Loan Ass n26 was the first of two modem benchmark cases on
capitalization versus current deduction. In that case, the IRS chal-
lenged Lincoln Savings when it attempted to deduct an "additional
[insurance] premium" the bank paid to the Federal Savings and Loan
27Insurance Corporation. In the years prior to this litigation, Lincoln
Savings had properly deducted its insurance premiums as normal
business expenditures. 28 So it was perhaps a logical step in reason-
ing when, in 1962, the bank was required to pay a second premium,
that the second premium would also be deductible. Lincoln Savings
relied on the fact that the second premium was also mandatory, like
the first, in characterizing it as a necessary business expense.29 The
Supreme Court, however, saw the issue differently. It reasoned that
since Lincoln Savings actually held a pro rata share in the Secondary
Reserve to which it paid its additional premium, the bank had a
property interest in the Secondary Reserve. 30 In other words, the ad-
ditional premium created an asset. The Court explained, in often
quoted language:
[T]he presence of an ensuing benefit that may have some
future aspect is not controlling; many expenses concededly
deductible have prospective effect beyond the taxable
year .... What is important and controlling, we feel, is that
the [additional premium] payment serves to create or en-
hance for Lincoln what is essentially a separate and distinct
additional asset .... 3 1
25. This rule is referred to as "abandoned transaction" deductions.
26. 403 U.S. 345 (1971).
27. See id. at 348-49.
28. See id. at 352.
29. See id. at 354.
30. See id. at 355.
31. Id. at 354.
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Little did the 1971 Court realize that its "separate and distinct
asset" language would become a widely disputed and greatly misun-
derstood piece of stare decisis in the world of tax law. Notwith-
standing its holding, requiring capitalization, Lincoln Savings actu-
ally created a more deduction-friendly climate. By changing the
capitalization trigger from benefits to assets, capitalization became
more difficult to find. Current deduction became easier. After all, a
future benefit can be interpreted from just about any expense, while
asset creation proves the rarer occurrence.
2. The varied interpretations of Lincoln Savings
In one of the first cases to interpret Lincoln Savings, Briarcliff
Candy Corp. v. Commissioner,32 the Second Circuit faced the ques-
tion of whether costs incurred in the process of convincing retailers
to carry a corporation's candy were deductible. The Tax Court had
determined that the expenses must be capitalized because they cre-
ated benefits that extended well beyond the current tax year.7 But
the Second Circuit reversed, citing Lincoln Savings as the basis for
its holding that future benefits should be completely ignored.34 The
court further explained that since it could not characterize the ex-
penses as creating a separate and distinct asset, the expenses were
deductible.35 Essentially, the court said that the addition of whole-
sale customers was not tangible enough to be properly considered an
asset.36
In the two decades that followed Briarcliff, the circuit courts
usually adhered to this reading of Lincoln Savings.3 7 For instance, in
Colorado Springs National Bank v. United States,38 the plaintiff bank
attempted to deduct all costs associated with overhauling its credit
card system.39 The court asserted that the costs in question went
32. 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973).
33. See Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Comm'r, 31 T.C.M. 171 (CCH) (1972).
34. See Briarcliff, 475 F.2d at 782-83.
35. See id. at 782.
36. See id. at 782-83.
37. See, e.g., infra notes 38-43.
38. 505 F.2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1974).
39. See id. at 1186. When Colorado Springs bought the right to use Master
Charge (the Master Card credit system), it had to both supplement and alter its
existing credit system to accommodate the high-technology Master Charge
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toward modernizing an old business rather than creating a new busi-
ness altogether.40 In this way, explained the Tenth Circuit, the ex-
penses were deductible because they did not create a separate and
distinct asset.4' Prior to Lincoln Savings, the credit card system
overhaul probably would have been a capital expense because, of
course, it would provide benefits extending far beyond the year of
the expense.
In the most surprising interpretation of Lincoln Savings, NCNB
Corp. v. United States,42 the Fourth Circuit determined that consult-
ing and application costs associated with establishing new bank
branches were currently deductible. 43 The court reasoned that the
process of opening new branches was actually an ordinary business
practice for NCNB.44 It managed to characterize the new branches,
not as separate and distinct assets, but as vital extensions of the ex-
isting organization. 45 NCNB Corp. stands out as the most egregious
of the broad circuit court interpretations of Lincoln Savings.
Such creative interpretations of Lincoln Savings were not the
only problem. Other circuit courts found ways to interpret the
seemingly deduction-friendly language from that case in favor of
capitalization. For instance, the Fifth Circuit, in Central Texas Sav-
ings & Loan Ass'n v. United States,46 held that research and attor-
ney's fees for establishing new bank branches were capital. At
times, even the Supreme Court itself conveniently shelved its "sepa-
rate and distinct asset" test.47
system. See id. at 1187.
40. See id. at 1190.
41. See id. at 1190-91.
42. 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982).
43. See id. at 292. Cf Cent. Tex. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 731
F.2d 1181, 1185-86 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that research and attorneys' fees
for establishing new bank branches are capital expenses).
44. See NCNB, 684 F.2d at 292.
45. See id.
46. 731 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. 1984).
47. See Comn'r v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 340 (1974); United States v.
Miss. Chem. Corp., 405 U.S. 298, 311 (1972).
1574
OFFICER SALARYDEDUCTABILITY
3. 1NDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner
48
In 1992, the Supreme Court found a case that allowed it to clar-
ify the rule of law as set forth in Lincoln Savings. 1NDOPCO Inc. v.
Commissioner, ended an era of deduction-friendly corporate ac-
counting and became the new benchmark case. It also brought forth
what would become a more common and often complex subissue of
capitalization: merger and acquisition costs.
The merger costs at issue in INDOPCO came about when
Unilever United States Inc. ("Unilever") approached one of its sup-
pliers, National Starch and Chemical Corp. ("National Starch") about
a friendly takeover.49 The National Starch board of directors hired
the investment banking firm of Morgan Stanley & Co. to determine
the value of National Starch's shares and perform the obligatory fair-
ness opinion.
50
Based upon Morgan Stanley's valuation of their stock, National
Starch negotiated for the sale of its stock to Unilever at a price well
above what Unilever had originally asked.5' When the deal was
complete, Morgan Stanley sent a bill to National Starch for over $2.2
million.52 National Starch proceeded to deduct this entire bill in the
single tax year of 1978.53 As might be expected, the IRS disagreed
with National Starch's classification of the investment banking
valuation fees as ordinary and necessary expenses under § 162(a). 4
National Starch took its case to the Tax Court.
55
After losing in both the Tax Court and the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals, National Starch petitioned for certiorari. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari with the intention of settling the "perceived
48. 503 U.S. 79 (1992).
49. See id. at 80. Unilever was a holding company, with Thomas J. Lipton,
Inc. as one of its major subsidiaries. See id. at 80 n.1. National Starch was a
Delaware corporation that produced adhesives, starch, and various chemicals.
See id. at 80.
50. See id. at 81.
51. See id. Unilever began negotiations with a target price of between S65
and $70 per share. The deal closed at $73.50 per share, which Morgan Stanley
agreed was a fair price. See id.
52. See id. at 82. National Starch also had over $500,000 in merger-related
legal costs which they did not attempt to deduct. See id.
53. See id. at 81-82.
54. See id. at 82.
55. See id. at 82-83.
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conflict" among the courts of appeal regarding the Lincoln Savings
rule of law.5 6 The Supreme Court held that the investment banking
fees incurred in a friendly takeover were capital because they would
lead directly to long-term benefits for National Starch. 7 In reaching
this decision, the Court stressed that although a "separate and dis-
tinct" asset will usually be sufficient to require capitalization, it is not
necessary.5 8 The result: Focus was back on future benefits and away
from asset creation.
59
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. The Facts of Wells Fargo & Co. v. Commissioner
60
The petitioner in the original Tax Court action was the Norwest
Corporation, a holding company for a large group of finance corpo-
rations.61 Norwest consisted of seventy-nine banks in twelve states,
as well as various other financial institutions.62 The payments that
Norwest sought to deduct were incurred by a corporation that it
eventually acquired as an affiliate, DBTC ("Davenport").63
Davenport, a small regional bank with four branches, served
customers in and around the Quad Cities area on the border of Iowa
and Illinois.64 Its stock was traded in modest volume on the
56. Id. at 83.
57. See id. at 88. National Starch tried to downplay the beneficial effects of
the merger, calling them "merely incidental," but the Supreme Court pointed to
the corporation's own reports touting the benefits of the merger. Id.
58. Id. at 87.
59. Although the creation of assets still required capitalization after
INDOPCO, the issue received less attention because it was, by then, well set-
tled.
60. 224 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2000).
61. See Norwest Corp. v. Comm'r, 112 T.C. 89, 90 (1999). Norwest Cor-
poration is listed on the New York and Midwest Stock Exchanges. See id.
62. See id. Norwest files consolidated federal income tax returns for all its
affiliates, which explains why Norwest, rather than New Davenport, appears as
the petitioner in this case. See id.
63. See id. The Tax Court opinion refers to this target corporation only as
DBTC. See id. at 90. In adopting the Tax Court's factual findings into its
opinion, the court of appeals changed all references to DBTC to "Davenport."
Wells Fargo, 224 F.3d at 876. This Note adopts the circuit court's renaming of
DBTC.
64. See Norwest, 112 T.C. at 90-91.
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Davenport over-the-counter market.65 As noted by both the Tax
Court and the appeals court in this case, approximately one-third of
the bank's 1.2 million shares were held by the founder and his chil-
dren.66 These shareholders also served as the corporate officers of
Davenport.
67
When, in 1989, the Iowa legislature allowed banks from bor-
dering states to acquire in-state banks for the first time, Davenport
management became concerned that their bank might be left behind
in the inevitable reorganization of the Iowa banking industry.6s Ac-
cordingly, when Norwest approached the bank about "joining their
businesses," Davenport expressed immediate interest.69 The board of
directors of Davenport authorized its executive officers John K.
Figge, James K. Figge, and Thomas K. Figge to obtain outside legal
counsel and other professional services to facilitate the merger.70
The board also appointed its own ad hoc committee of outside di-
rectors, responsible for obtaining professional advice on the im-
pending transaction.7'
The executive officers proceeded to hire the lav firm of Lane &
Waterman to assist in legal and nonlegal research on the probable
65. See id. at 91.
66. See id.; Wells Fargo, 224 F.3d at 876 (adopting figures used in the Tax
Court proceeding).
67. See Wells Fargo, 224 F.3d at 878.
68. See Norvest, 112 T.C. at 91. The Iowa legislation did not directly al-
low the merger at issue here since Davenport eventually merged with another
Iowa bank, but its perceived effects caused Davenport to entertain Norwest's
offer. Davenport feared that, as a result of the legislation, national banks
would move into the Quad City market, squeezing Davenport out of the mar-
ket. See id.
69. Id. at 91. The proposed transaction would have Davenport merge with
one of Norwest's affiliated banks-Bettendorf Bank, National Association
("Bettendorf'). The two banks would be consolidated into a national bank
called New Davenport. See id. at 93. Bettendorf was a national banking asso-
ciation under charter of the office of the Comptroller of Currency. See id. at
92. The merger would be simplified by the fact that Bettendorf operated ex-
clusively in the same Quad City area as Davenport. See id. at 90-91.
70. See id. at 92. The founder, V.0. Figge, objected to the merger and was
not involved in the initial stages of the deal. He later agreed that the merger
would benefit both Davenport and its customers. See id. at 92-93.
71. See id. at 92. The committee was also commissioned to perform a due
diligence review, and to report to the board on the fairness of the potential
deal. See id.
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effects of a merger with Norwest.72 Davenport also enlisted the in-
vestment banking services of J.P. Morgan & Co., to perform the
customary fairness opinion for the sake of Davenport's stockhold-
ers.73 Finally, Davenport hired KPMG Peat Marwick to determine if
the merger would be considered a reorganization under federal in-
come tax laws, and whether it would qualify for a "desired method of
accounting."
74
1. The transaction and related expenses
The result of these negotiations was that, in January of 1992,
Davenport merged with a Norwest affiliate bank to form a national
bank, called New Davenport, owned by Norwest.75 After the merger,
New Davenport operated out of the same offices and four branches
that Davenport had previously occupied.76 It also used the three lo-
cations of the former Norwest affiliate bank with which it merged."
New Davenport offered expanded products and services, and its
board and management overtly expected that "significant long-term
benefits" would soon follow.
78
The participation of the Figge family, as Davenport's executive
officers and major shareholders, was a necessary element in con-
cluding the deal. For instance, Norwest established a voting agree-
ment with John Figge, James Figge, Thomas Figge, and a few other
shareholders, whose combined holdings were 24.5% of Davenport's
stock. 79 These shareholders agreed to vote their shares in favor of
72. See id. Lane & Waterman helped determine whether Davenport would
"strategically fit with Norwest and its affiliates, and whether [the deal] would
be good for the community." Id.
73. See id. at 92. Note that a "fairness opinion" was one of the services,
along with a valuation of shares, that J.P. Morgan & Co., Inc., performed for
National Starch in INDOPCO. See INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm'r, 503 U.S. 79,
81(1992).
74. Northwest, 112 T.C. at 92. Again, the facts mirror those in INDOPCO,
where the merger was dependant on the initial determination that it would
qualify as a tax free reorganization under I.R.C. § 351. See id.; INDOPCO,
Inc. v. Comm'r, 503 U.S. 79, 80-81 (1992).
75. See Norwest, 112 T.C. at 92, 94. The Davenport affiliate referred to
was Bettendorf (BBNA).
76. See id. at 95.
77. See id.
78. Id.
79. See id. at 93.
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- transaction and otherwise render assistance in pushing the merger
-ough completion.80 These same members of the Figge family,
th the addition of V.0. Figge, Davenport's founder, contracted
th Norwest to ensure that they would be employed as officers of
,w Davenport.8' Nonetheless, Davenport's officers were paid the
me salaries during the period in which they helped facilitate the
erger as in previous years.
8 2
2. Davenport's 1991 federal income tax return
Davenport properly capitalized under § 263 all fees paid to J.P.
lorgan and KPMG Peat Marwick 83-undoubtedly because Daven-
ort's accountants were aware of the INDOPCO rule of law and the
nmistakable similarities between the fees at issue in that case and
ae fees in the instant case.8 4 But, Davenport proceeded to deduct the
111 bill of $474,018 for the legal services of Lane & Waterman.
8S
?he IRS took exception to this deduction and issued a deficiency no-
ice.86 Davenport conceded that they erred in deducting the entire
)ill, and alleged that the proper deduction should have been for only
:hose investigatory services rendered prior to the decision to merge,
:r $111,270.7
Davenport also deducted its officers' salaries for the 1991 tax
year. A total of $150,000 worth of the salaries could be attributed to
work performed in the transaction.88 The IRS again responded by
80. See id.
81. See id. John, James, and Thomas Figge were to be made senior vice-
presidents of the new bank, and the other members of the board were assured
positions on the board of directors. See id.
82. See id. at 96.
83. See id.
84. See INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm'r, 503 U.S. 79 (1992); Norwest Corp. v.
Comm'r, 112 T.C. 89 (1999). Petitioners in both cases are smaller firms being
absorbed into larger corporations. The fees in the cases covered investment
banking fairness opinions and due diligence, and both transactions hinged on
whether or not the transaction would qualify as a tax-free reorganization under
I.R.C. § 351.
85. See Northwest, 112 T.C. at 95.
86. The existence of the deficiency notice is inferred from the venue of the
original action.
87. See Northwest, 112 T.C. at 95.
88. See id. at 96.
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demanding that the $150,000 be capitalized under § 263. The casi
was brought before the Tax Court.
B. The United States Tax Court Decision
The Tax Court chose not to address the deductibility of the in-
vestment banking fees.89 Perhaps not wishing to issue an advisory
opinion, the court noted that petitioners had conceded to capitaliza-
tion of these expenses.90 However, the court went on to introduce
the issues of the officers' salaries and legal fees9 1-issues the court
lumped together and dispensed as essentially identical.
The court held that none of the expenses Davenport claimed as
deductions were actually deductible under § 162(a). It framed the
current state of case law in this way: INDOPCO demands that an
expense is capital if it creates a long-term benefit, but an expense is
also capital if it creates a separate and distinct asset.93 In other
words, INDOPCO had not overturned any part of the Lincoln Sav-
ings holding, it had simply added a new requirement on top of the
existing ones from Lincoln Savings.94
Following a review of the holdings in INDOPCO, Victory Mar-
kets v. Commissioner,95 and A.E. Staley Manufacturing v. Commis-
sioner,96 the Tax Court labored to analogize the cases with the facts
of the present case. Ultimately, it concluded:
The disputed expenses are mostly preparatory expenses that
enabled [Davenport] to achieve the long-term benefit that it
desired from the transaction, and the fact that the costs were
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 97.
93. See id.
94. It seems that this interpretation of INDOPCO is the strictest of all inter-
pretations in favor of capitalization. By preserving the old barrier and creating
a new one, both of which are mandatory, the Tax Court would leave a very
narrow, if not nonexistent margin, for deductible expenses related to corporate
consolidations.
95. 99 T.C. 648 (1992) (holding that INDOPCO prohibits current deduc-
tions of expenses for professional services incurred incident to a takeover that
was not hostile).
96. 105 T.C. 166 (1995) (holding that investment banking fees related to a
takeover are capital in nature).
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incurred before [Davenport's] management formally de-
cided to enter into the transaction does not change the fact
that all these costs [must be capitalized because they were]
sufficiently related to the transaction. In accordance with
INDOPCO, the costs must be capitalized .... 97
The court held that Davenport "may not deduct any of the dis-
puted costs because all costs . . . produced a significant long-term
benefit. 98 No indication was given as to what "significant" might
mean in this context. Not satisfied with the Tax Court's standard for
the requisite relationship between the expense and benefit, Daven-
port appealed to the Eighth Circuit.
C. The Eighth Circuit Reverses in Part
Justice Hand began his analysis with a breakdown of NDOPCO
and Lincoln Savings, recognizing that there are only four possible
combinations of asset creation and future benefit.99 The court said
that three of the four possible combinations produce absolute re-
sults. 100 The presence of a separate asset will require capitalization,
whether or not there is a future benefit. And, of course, no asset and
no benefit will never warrant capitalization. However, Justice Hand
noted that, unfortunately, the expenditures at issue in the instant case
fall into a nebulous, fourth category: no separate asset, but long-term
benefits. 1' 1 The Tax Court, he said, erred when it jumped to the con-
clusion that the presence of a future benefit always requires capitali-
zation.'0 2 The Tax Court should have performed an "independent
97. Norwest, 112 T.C. at 100 (emphasis added).
98. Id. at 102. Although the Tax Court must have assumed that the figures
for "disputed costs" were apparent from the rest of the opinion, the Eighth Cir-
cuit clarified them as: "$150,000 worth of salaries paid to Davenport's corpo-
rate officers [and] ... $111,270 of fees and disbursement paid to Davenport's
attorneys." Wells Fargo & Co. v. Comm'r, 224 F.3d 874, 876 (2000). Without
this clarification, one might wonder whether the Tax Court considered, for in-
stance, all officer salaries from 1991 to be "disputed costs."
99. See Wells Fargo, 224 F.3d at 879-85. The "four combinations" were
not labeled as such, but the suggestion is there. At the risk of stating the obvi-
ous, they are: (1) asset and benefit, (2) asset and no benefit, (3) benefit and no
asset, and (4) no asset and no benefit.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 885.
102. See id. at 886.
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and appropriate legal analysis to determine whether each of the ex-
penditures at issue were 'ordinary."" 10 3 At this point the Court la-
mented that "[t]here is no easy answer for this question."'
10 4
The court went on to address the issue of officer salaries. Fol-
lowing a brief historical argument in favor of deduction for all offi-
cer salaries,10 5 the court introduced the "origin of the claim doc-
trine.' 0 6  Justice Hand argued that, although this doctrine was
originally used to differentiate between personal and business ex-
penses, it should apply to officer salary capitalization issues as
well. 10 7 If the expense is directly related to the transaction that pro-
vides a benefit, it should be capitalized.108 But if it is only indirectly
related, then it may be currently deducted. 10 9 Applying the newly
coined test, the court concluded that Davenport's officer salaries
were only indirectly related because they arose from a preexisting
employment relationship."10 The salaries were held fully deducti-
ble.'
I
The remaining question was what to do with a disputed $27, 820
of legal bills. The circuit court preferred a temporal test, where the
defining moment was the final decision to go ahead with the transac-
tion. 112  Under that test, costs preceding the final decision were
termed "investigatory costs" and held currently deductible."13 Any
bills for work done after the decision were deemed too closely re-
lated to a future benefit."14 On this issue, the Tax Court was up-
held. " 5
103. Id. (emphasis added).
104. Id. at 884.
105. See id. at 886.
106. Id.
107. See id. at 886-87.
108. See id. at 887.
109. See id. at 888.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 888-89.
113. See id. at 889.
114. See id.
115. See id. Justice Bright wrote a brief concurring opinion emphasizing the
importance of extensive fact-finding at the Tax Court level, especially with re-
gard to the direct or indirect relationship between the officers' work and the
transaction. See id. at 889-90.
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Direct/Indirect Test for Officer Salaries
On the issue of deductibility of officer salaries during merger,
the Eighth Circuit created the direct/indirect test. The test raises a
couple of concerns. The first is that, in merger cases, it offers no an-
swer to the question of what kinds of future benefits lead to capitali-
zation in the absence of asset creation. The second is that the Wells
Fargo opinion suggests applicability of the direct/indirect test out-
side of the merger context. In general deductibility cases, the lan-
guage of the test is so vague as to render it impossible to apply with
consistency.
1. Why the test fails
The issue of future benefits actually embodies two subissues:
(1) what kinds of future benefits require capitalization, and (2) what
relationship must exist between the expense and the future benefit to
warrant capitalization? The capitalization cases since INDOPCO,
and indeed INDOPCO itself, tend to focus on one or the other of
these issues, never seeming to realize both subissues in any given
case. The direct/indirect test addresses only this second question. It
speaks to the relationship of a portion of officer salary to the "trans-
action which provides a long term benefit.""16 However, the very
nature of this two-pronged issue demands that one subissue be re-
solved before the other. Without first determining what kinds of fu-
ture benefits must result from the merger, the relationship issue is
meaningless.
The problem becomes evident when the direct/indirect test is
applied. The test was never actually applied in the Wells Fargo
opinion because there were no specific costs on record upon which to
apply the test.1 7 Justice Bright was correct, in concurrence, to regret
116. Id. at 886.
117. The court said, "Upon consideration of the facts and circumstances of
this case, we determine that Davenport's salary expenses are directly related to
(and arise out of) the employment relationship, and are only indirectly related
to the acquisition itself." Id. at 888 (Bright, J., concurring). But the stipulated
facts adopted from the Tax Court do not contain any "facts and circumstances"
pertaining to the nature of work to which the officer salaries were attributable.
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that the Tax Court record lacked specific facts as to what "officers'
time [was] devoted to the acquisition as compared to time spent on
regular work during a particular and relevant time period."' 18 With-
out such facts, the court was not able to apply the test. But instead of
remanding for further factual determinations, the court chose to ren-
der a decision.'19
In the absence of actual facts from the case, one can only try to
apply the direct/indirect test to a hypothetical quantity of work hours.
Take, for instance, a meeting between Davenport officers and Nor-
west officers discussing the impending due diligence review by
Norwest1 20 Applying the direct/indirect test to this meeting, some
significant crossover appears between "work directly related to the
employment relationship" and "work directly related to the capital
transaction."'121 For instance, during this meeting, the Davenport of-
ficers' fiduciary duty to the shareholders comes directly from the
employment relationship. 122 As full-time employees, rather than in-
dependent contractors, the officers' very presence at the meeting also
stems directly from the employment relationship. 123 Yet the meeting
would not have taken place but for the impending transaction, and
thus, one could argue, it is directly related to the transaction. Of
course, the final decision to merge has not yet been made, so the
meeting may not be directly related to the transaction in that sense.
The argument could continue in this fashion, but the point is that the
direct/indirect test hales its own interpretive mess. It requires a pre-
liminary determination of whether corporate officer salaries, the "ex-
pense" in question, should be considered (1) compensation for acting
See id. at 890. The court could only have guessed, and thus, based its decision
on that guess.
118. Id. at 890.
119. See id. at 888-89.
120. Such a meeting most likely occurred at one time. The actual due dili-
gence review was a stipulated fact in the case, and such a large undertaking,
where the resources of both companies commingle, would require initial plan-
ning.
121. Wells Fargo, 224 F.3d at 887.
122. See RICHARD W. JENNINGS & RICHARD M. BAUXBAUM,
CORPORATIONs 514-43 (5th ed. 1979).
123. In other words, it is the officers' duty to work toward the best interest of
the company in any capacity, regardless of whether or not there is a merger on
the horizon. By contrast, independently contracted professionals would owe a
duty to both their company and the contracting company.
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as a fiduciary, (2) the terms of an employment contract, or (3) a vari-
able depending on the demands of the job.
The direct/indirect test is a semantics nightmare because it de-
mands such difficult preliminary determinations. Ultimately, the test
laid out by the Eighth Circuit adds another layer of jargon to an al-
ready complicated issue and its growing body of precedent. This
particular issue, more than most in tax law, calls for application of
rules over standards. This assertion will be discussed more thor-
oughly infra.
2. The test should have been limited to officer salary issues
Another concern is that the court failed to limit the di-
rect/indirect test to issues of officer salaries. On the one hand, the
court's own use of the test implies that it should be limited to deter-
mining the tax status of officer salaries. After all, the court em-
ployed the test only in the subsection of the opinion that addressed
officer salaries, and then abandoned the test as it moved to the issue
of attorney's fees. 124 However, when the court introduced the test, it
explained: "Although the 'origin of the claim doctrine' was origi-
nally used to distinguish personal expenses from business expenses,
it has been extended to distinguish capital business expenses from
ordinary expenses."' 25 This is basically an invitation to future courts
and litigants to apply the test to issues of capital expenditures gener-
ally.
The court also explained how the direct/indirect test is derived
from the holding of INDOPCO.1'6 The problem is, INDOPCO did
not involve questions of officer salaries. Taking the direct/indirect
test outside the context of officer salaries creates the impetus for fu-
ture litigants and lower courts to expand the test beyond its use in
this case. At least when the direct/indirect test was applied to officer
salaries, it tended to preserve the outcome determinations of the
controlling statutes. When allowed outside this context, the test
completely falls apart.
124. See Wells Fargo, 224 F.3d at 886-89.
125. Id. at 886.
126. "The INDOPCO case addressed costs which were directly related to the
acquisition, while the instant case involves costs which were only indirectly
related to the acquisition." Id. at 886.
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If the direct/indirect test is applied to other typical capitalization
issues, it no longer follows the outline of § 263. For instance, what
happens when courts employ this test in deciding the tax status of
advertisement consulting expenses, which are generally accepted as
deductible? 127 Here, the expense would, indeed, be "directly related
to the transaction which provides the long-term benefit."' 128 The
payment of advertising fees essentially is the transaction that pro-
vides the long-term benefit. This test would demand capitalization
for a historically deductible expense. It would require overturning a
long and well-established line of precedent. 129
The direct/indirect test would also seem to require capitalization
of loan origination expenses (LOEs) since they, too, directly relate to
the "transaction" which provides the long-term benefit. LOEs are, in
fact, the cost of the loan transaction itself. It is hard to imagine how
they could be more "directly" related to the transaction. Yet LOEs
are one of the most ordinary and necessary services a bank per-
forms. 130  The examples of divergence between the direct/indirect
test and longstanding principles in the law of capitalization and de-
duction could continue ad nauseam.1
3 1
3. A better approach
The tax classification of officer salaries during times of reor-
ganization has been and will be a recurring issue, and those instances
of recurrence will have little, usually negligible, factual variations.
132
127. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a); Colonial Ice Cream, Co. v. Comm'r,
7 B.T.A. 154, 156-57 (1927).
128. Wells Fargo, 224 F.3d at 886.
129. See id. at 886-89.
130. See generally Roger T. Weitkamp, Taxation of Loan Origination Ex-
penditures: Lenders May No Longer Bank on Deductibility, 16 GA. ST. U. L.
REv. 477 (1999) (outlining how the IRS is systematically attacking the tradi-
tionally deductible status of LOEs); Alan B. Rosenthal, Comment, Deductibil-
ity of Loan Origination Costs, 43 BuFF. L. REv. 263 (1995) (arguing that the
future of LOEs will move away from deduction toward capitalization).
131. Such examples would include repairs, start-up costs, and hazardous
waste removal; each of which has its own body of law that is either inconsis-
tent with, or difficult to apply to the terms of the direct/indirect test. See, e.g.,
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-4 (1995) (repair costs); Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(a) (1995)
(repair costs); I.R.C. § 195(a)-(c) (1995) (start-up costs); Midland Empire
Packing Co. v. Comm'r, 14 T.C. 635 (1950) (hazardous waste removal).
132. Despite the likelihood of recurrence, the issue is narrow by definition,
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For that reason, the issue demands a rule-like judicial test. Such a
test would prove more efficient-both judicially and administra-
tively-while preserving the benefits of a more discretionary stan-
dard.
A preferable test would ask, simply, whether the corporate offi-
cers were paid higher salaries during the period of acquisition.133 A
negative answer would create the judicial presumption that the sala-
ries were ordinary, and thus, deductible. If the matter went to court,
the burden would be on the IRS to overcome the presumption by
proving that a specific portion of the officer salaries for the year of
reorganization can be attributed to work facilitating merger. On the
other hand, an affirmative answer would create the presumption that
the difference between the new salaries and the salaries of the last
full fiscal year before merger efforts began, is capital. The corpora-
tion would then have the burden of proving that the increased salary
was attributable to something other than merger-related work. For
continuing reference, this test will be called the "relative salaries"
test.
Consider what this test does for efficiency. On the broadest
level of this argument lies the ideal behind stare decisis. As more
and more cases arise, the courts decide how each set of unique fac-
tual circumstances fares against the backdrop of the statute or com-
mon law rule. Theoretically, there should come a day when all pos-
sible fact patterns have been exhausted, and the outcome of a given
case is totally predetermined. The test suggested here carves out two
possible factual situations-(l) where the salaries are the same as in
previous years, and (2) where the salaries are different-and pro-
vides outcomes for each. Tax practitioners, accountants, and the IRS
would now have something solid upon which to make decisions in
this area. The test in Wells Fargo, by contrast, adds more complex-
ity to the linguistic backdrop against which fact patterns must be
having three qualifiers: merger, officer, and salaries. These ensure little factual
variation from instance to instance compared to, for example, personal versus
business expenditures.
133. A necessary precursor to this question is whether the fees in dispute
were paid to officers of the corporation clainzing deduction, or to independ-
ently contracted professional services. If the fees were paid to independent
contractors, then there is no need for this proposed test. In those cases, one
should defer to the court's analysis for legal fees in the instant case.
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held. Rather than aid interpretation, it becomes something to be in-
terpreted itself.
Notice, also, that the relative salaries test eliminates the two
major problems with the direct/indirect test discussed in the previous
subsections. First, no initial interpretation is needed because the test
speaks in terms of relative dollar amounts. Second, the vocabulary
of the test itself ensures that courts cannot apply it to general capi-
talization and deduction issues. The test contains the word "salary,"
making it irrelevant to issues of LOEs, advertising expenses, and
other deduction issues.
Essentially, the argument unfolding here falls within the rules-
versus-standard debate. 134 It advocates a rulelike approach to de-
ductibility of officer salaries during merger. The relative salaries test
occupies a place somewhere near the rule's end of the rule/standard
continuum15--at least compared to the Wells Fargo test. By one
popular definition of "rule," the relative salaries test is a rule because
it is given substance ex ante. 136 That is, the test's outcome depends
upon a predetermined value, albeit a relative value. However, to the
extent that the test creates a rebuttable presumption, it retains quali-
ties of a standard. Compare this to the direct/indirect test, which can
only be given content ex post. Each new application of the di-
rect/indirect test requires new determinations of the meaning of the
words direct and indirect with respect to the specific expense and
transaction.
One of the cornerstones of the rule-versus-standards debate is
the notion that rules are more costly for the government to formulate,
while standards are more costly for the taxpayer to understand.
137
This author would suggest that when the court, as opposed to the
134. For critical literature on the rules-versus-standards debate, see James
W. Colliton, Standards, Rules, and the Decline of the Courts in the Law of
Taxation, 99 DICK. L. REV. 265 (1995); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Stan-
dards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); John Lee et al., Re-
stating Capitalization Standards and Rules: The Case for Rough Justice
Regulations, 23 OHio N.U. L. REV. 631 (1997).
135. Professor Kaplow explains that rules and standards are not "pure types"
and that most laws retain qualities of both. See Kaplow, supra note 136, at
561-62.
136. See id.
137. See, e.g., id.
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legislature, creates rules, the cost of formulation all but disappears.
The court need not determine the range of probable fact patterns in a
given area of law. It need only work with one fact pattern at a time,
which has been carefully packaged and delivered. On the other
hand, a standard like the direct/indirect test will increase costs to tax-
payers and the IRS. Taxpayers, naturally, will interpret the test as
favorable to deduction while the IRS will interpret it as favorable to
capitalization. The result, of course, will be increased litigation and
expense.
The relative salaries test would also avoid a common criticism
of rules, that they are over- and underinclusive, 138 because the test's
initial determination merely creates a rebuttable presumption. Ad-
mittedly, there will be instances where corporate officer salaries re-
main equal from merger years to previous years, even though the of-
ficers have dedicated substantial, compensated time to merger
efforts. In these cases, the test would seem underinclusive-allow-
ing for current deduction when capitalization is proper. Conversely,
the test would become overinclusive where an inflation in the corpo-
ration's officer salaries happens to coincide with a merger. But again,
the relative salaries test creates a rebuttable presumption to cover
these instances. In the overinclusive scenario, an innocent corpora-
tion should find little trouble overcoming the presumption, with its
inherent knowledge of its own compensation scheme and schedule of
raises. In the underinclusive scenario, the IRS would encounter a
similarly light burden by virtue of the fact that major corporate reor-
ganizations tend to leave major paper trails.
The courts should consider that tax law is an area of law exam-
ined closely by many nonlawyer professionals. Accountants and IRS
agents are not accustomed to the idiosyncrasies of legal theory; to
balancing tests and terms of art. They "crunch numbers" and they
expect no less of the judicial system which so often affects the for-
mulas they use. The test advocated here offers yes and no answers,
and specifies who and what must be shown when the parties do not
agree with those answers. This helps potential parties make better-
educated decisions about the likely outcome of challenging a claim
or ruling. The parties would have a better idea of what the court will
138. See id. at 586-95.
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presume, and exactly what evidence will be required if they expect to
overcome the presumption. Potential litigants would not have to
gamble on how the next court might interpret the nebulous words of
the last.
B. Wells Fargo's Effect on Capitalization Cases Generally
1. Defining future benefits?
Since 1NDOPCO, there have been few, if any, judicially con-
structed parameters on the "future benefits" language from that
case. 139 Wells Fargo, coupled with the recent PNC Bancorp140 case,
mark the only significant circuit court attempts at setting those pa-
rameters. The decision in this case was heavily anticipated for its
interpretation of 1NDOPCO. But if Wells Fargo is to be interpreted
as an effort to further define the future benefits test of INDOPCO, it
cannot be seen as a very effective one.
The circuit court plainly leads up to the expectation that it will
discuss exactly what kinds of future benefits do, in fact, warrant
capitalization.14' But when it comes to doing an actual analysis
based on the facts of the case, the court diverts its attention to the
question of how "directly" related the expense must be to the bene-
fit.142 Whereas past merger cases have often played with the notion
that not all mergers produce benefit, the Wells Fargo court either
chose to overlook the issue, or did not realize it existed. 43 The court
139. See David Lupi-Sher, Tax Bar Applauds Eighth Circuit's Decision in
Wells Fargo, 88 TAX NOTES 1303 (2000). But see PNC Bancorp, Inc. v.
Comm'r, 212 F.3d 822, 824 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that loan origination ex-
penditures are deductible as producers of future benefits).
140. See PNC Bancorp, 212 F.3d at 822 (3d Cir. 2000).
141. At the end of the "Issues of Law" section of the opinion, Justice Hand
explained that where there is no separate and distinct asset, but an anticipated
future benefit, "there is no easy answer." Wells Fargo & Co. v. Comm'r, 224
F.3d 874, 885 (2000). The expectation is that the subsequent section will at-
tempt an answer.
142. See 224 F.3d at 886-90; supra notes 66-94 and accompanying text.
143. Justice Blackmun wrote in INDOPCO, "Although petitioner attempts to
dismiss the benefits that accrued to National Starch from the Unilever acquisi-
tion as 'entirely speculative' or 'merely incidental,' the Tax Court's and the
Court of Appeals' findings that the transaction produced significant benefits to
National Starch that extended beyond the tax year in question are amply sup-
ported by the record." INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm'r, 503 U.S. 79, 88 (1992)
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seemed to take for granted that corporate mergers always produce
benefits for the parties involved. Whether they do or not should be a
question which turns on the unique facts of each case. So, it seems
that while the Eighth Circuit was attempting to curtail IRS en-
croachment into traditionally deductible areas, the court may have
overlooked half of the issue.
To be fair, determining whether a merger has resulted in benefits
cannot practically be done within the same tax year that the merger
occurs. Without the benefit of a crystal ball, the court can only as-
sume one way or the other. And given that the court must make an
assumption, the more rational assumption is that the merger would
result in benefit to the corporation. For one, corporations do not
normally merge without good reason to believe that the merger will
improve the bottom line. And in this particular case, the board of di-
rectors of Davenport actually issued a statement to the stockholders,
saying that it believed the merger would result in benefits to the
bank.144 To that extent, it would have been logical for the court to
assume that the merger would produce future benefits.
The problem, however, is that the court should have made its as-
sumption explicit, and limited such an assumption to friendly merger
cases. Instead, Wells Fargo practically begs Service agents to mis-
read its holding. For instance, in the context of capitalization and
deduction cases generally, Wells Fargo seems to unwittingly support
a presumption of future benefits sufficient for capitalization in any
case where the question arises. It tacitly bypassed the issue of what
kinds of future benefits suffice, but in doing so, resolves the issue in
favor of capitalization. Otherwise, the court would never have had to
address the relatedness of the benefit to the expense.
In the narrower context of mergers and acquisitions, A.E. Staley,
made it clear that the Service wants to capitalize acquisition-related
expenses, regardless of whether the acquisition was friendly or hos-
tile. Considering that the difference between a friendly and hostile
takeover is usually in future benefits to the acquired company, Wells
Fargo implicitly supports the Service's position that future benefits
sufficient for capitalization should be presumed in any corporate
merger.
(citation omitted).
144. See Wells Fargo, 224 F.3d at 878.
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As an addition to the body of precedent, Wells Fargo will place
more focus on the relationship between the expense and benefit,
while allowing that any potential future benefit is the equivalent of
an asset under § 263. This result is far from desirable. Common
sense dictates that not every business expense creates a future bene-
fit. To ignore this aspect of the issue is to turn away from the over-
arching principle of matching.
2. The favorable view of Wells Fargo
Finally, this Note arrives at an opportunity to explore a positive
aspect of Wells Fargo. Despite a problematic test on the question of
deductibility of officer salaries during merger, the end result of the
test as applied in this case is favorable. It seems to set an appropriate
standard for the requisite relatedness of the future benefit to the ex-
pense, despite the problems with the formulation of that standard.
The Tax Court had agreed with the Service agents' view that an
expense need only be "incidentally connected" to a future benefit.
145
Regardless of the problems with the direct/indirect test, it makes
clear that the Eighth Circuit categorically rejects the "incidentally
connected" theory.146 Rightly so, because any expense can be char-
acterized as incidentally connected with a future benefit. Consider-
ing that the "future benefits" language of INDOPCO has yet to be
narrowed in any notable way, it was almost imperative that the "inci-
dentally connected" test-another test extremely favorable to capi-
talization-be wiped out. Had the circuit court not drawn the pro-
verbial line where it did, one might wonder what business expenses,
at all, would remain to currently deduct. As discussed in the previ-
ous subsection of this Note, the means by which the court curtailed
the Tax Court's language leaves something to be desired in the realm
of clarity and practical application, but the fact that it actually did
was crucial.
V. CONCLUSION
When courts attempt to sort through the vague standards of
1NDOPCO, and the equally vague statutes, they should rule with a
145. Id. at 885.
146. See id.
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mind toward practicality. Tax law often lends itself nicely to rules
creation; with fact patterns that are likely to recur in substantially
similar forms. The Eighth Circuit in this case should have taken the
opportunity to taper the language of INDOPCO and relevant statutes.
Instead, the court unwisely broadened that language with a superflu-
ous test. Perhaps this is good for the business of tax practitioners
who will earn more fees trying to sort through the latest judicial ex-
ercise in semantics-but that, of course, is not the goal. The goal
should be eliminating abuses, rather than encouraging those who will
be tempted to interpret broad language in their favor. The goal
should be working toward an established statutory interpretation
where tax practitioners, accountants, and Service agents can deter-
mine, at first glance, the tax status of a given business expense.
This Note does not advocate going back to pre-INDOPCO
times, when deductibility was a somewhat reliable conclusion for the
expenses discussed herein. Indeed, the ubiquitous principle of
matching seems to demand more capitalization than was the standard
before INDOPCO. However, in authoring a new era of statutory in-
terpretation, as the courts must do to clean up the INDOPCO stan-
dard, the desirable outcome will place narrower rules upon the ex-
isting standards.
Brodie H. Smith*
* J.D. candidate, May 2002. I would like to thank Professor Katherine
Pratt for her generous advice at critical points in the writing of this Note. I
dedicate this Note to Thomas H. Smith, my father and mentor.
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